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Article
Becoming part of the gang? Established
and nonestablished populist parties
and the role of external efficacy
Werner Krause and Aiko Wagner
WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany
Abstract
In this article, we examine the extent to which the influence of external efficacy on support for populist parties is
conditional on the degree to which a populist party is an established player in a given party system. We do so using a
two-step regression approach that allows us to investigate the varying effect of external efficacy in a multilevel setting.
Making use of data on 23 European Union member states, we empirically demonstrate that the nature of support for
populists varies depending on the extent to which these parties are established actors in their national party systems.
This is true for Western and Eastern European populist parties. These findings make an important contribution to the
broader literature on the success and survival of populist parties. They indicate that these parties do not keep up their
image as radical opponents of the national political establishment the more they become electorally successful and join
government coalitions.
Keywords
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Introduction
Populism is one of the most talked-about phenomena in
contemporary political science. Scholars increasingly ask
for individual-level factors that can explain the rise and
survival of populist parties from a cross-national perspec-
tive (see, e.g. Akkerman et al., 2014; Rooduijn, 2018; Van
Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). We add to this literature
by examining the conditional role of external efficacy for
the support of populist parties in Europe. Previous studies
confirmed that disaffection with democratic actors and
institutions is a critical predictor of right- and left-wing
populist voting behavior (see, e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2008;
Kitschelt, 1995; Ramiro and Gomez, 2017; van der Brug
et al., 2000, 2005; Visser et al., 2014). At the same time,
recent research has shown that the importance of anti-elite
attitudes as a determinant of populist party support varies
tremendously throughout Europe. While some populist par-
ties significantly benefit from critical stances toward the
political elite among their voters, the popular support for
other populist parties does not rely on these attitudes (Roo-
duijn, 2018). In this article, we contribute to this puzzle by
asking whether parties still benefit from their image as
opponents of the political establishment when they are
electorally successful and join government coalitions. In
other words, is political disaffection only important for
nonestablished populist parties and of less relevance for
the support of more established populist parties?
We examine this question based on data on 36 populist
parties from 23 member states of the European Union (EU)
from the European Parliament Election Study (Schmitt
et al., 2015). Using a two-step regression design, we focus
on the influence of external efficacy—understood as the
perceived responsiveness of a political regime—on party
support conditional on the degree to which a populist party
is an established player in a given party system. We find
that feelings of lacking political responsiveness do not
motivate vote choice for all populist parties in the same
way. Instead, the results of our empirical analysis show
that the importance of low levels of external efficacy is
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moderated by the degree of establishment of the populist
party in question. While lacking external efficacy plays to
the electoral advantage of less established parties, that is,
younger and smaller parties without government experi-
ence, the impact of this attitude decreases the more the
party in question is a well-established part of its respective
party system.
This finding has two important implications. First, it
shows that the motives for supporting populist parties vary
across Europe. Although it is often assumed that populist
voters share displeasure for national political elites, the
impact of lacking feelings of external efficacy differs
remarkably between populist parties. As we show in our
analysis, this variation can be explained neither by a
divide between “the” East and “the” West nor by differ-
ences between left- and right-wing populist parties. Sec-
ond, this is the first article that aspires to explain this
variation. We demonstrate how the ongoing establishment
of populist parties undermines the role of external efficacy
as a determinant of vote choice. This finding emphasizes
that investigating the conditions of populist party success
requires to focus on the varying impact of individual-level
factors for differently established populist parties.
This article begins with a brief overview of external
efficacy and its impact on vote choice (second section).
On this basis, we formulate the guiding hypothesis for the
empirical analysis in the following sections (third and
fourth sections). After addressing the data situation, we
present the operationalization, analytical method (fifth sec-
tion), the results of the empirical analysis, and a series of
robustness checks (sixth section). The conclusion sums up
our findings (seventh section).
Antiestablishment orientations and their
role in determining populist vote choice
Populism was long regarded as an underspecified concept
mostly used unsystematically and inconsistently owing to
the diversity of the fields of application. Despite persisting
dissension on populism’s core characteristics, scholars
have eventually agreed on a minimal definition of the con-
cept during the past decade (see, e.g. Abts and Rummens,
2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Canovan, 2004;
March, 2011). According to Mudde (2004: 543), populism
is a “thin ideology” whose core consists of dividing society
into two homogeneous, diametrically opposed groups: the
people and the elite. Populist parties present themselves as
self-declared representatives of the “common people,” pro-
claiming the reinstatement of abused popular sovereignty
(Canovan, 1999: 2; see also Stanley, 2008).
Although left- and right-wing populist parties glorify
“the people” while simultaneously articulating a far-
reaching critique of political elites, the two party families
embed their criticism of elites in the framework of different
core ideologies—democratic socialism and nativism,
respectively (Me´ny and Surel, 2002; Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2013). The reasons for supporting populist par-
ties are thus divided into two main sets. First, one can argue
that citizens decide to vote for parties closest to their policy
stances. Attracted by either sociocultural right-wing or
socioeconomic left-wing stances of populists, voters are
pulled toward the respective party. Second, push factors
work in the opposite direction. Populist criticism is leveled
at parties and their perceived lack of responsiveness—in
particular, populist parties regard the policies of established
mainstream parties as indistinguishable (Pauwels, 2014).
Parliament, decried as a “talking shop” with protracted
processes of deliberation and decision-making, is another
main target of populist rejection. Populist parties criticize
intermediary authorities of the political establishment by
accusing them of not faithfully representing the alleged
popular will and of being unreceptive to citizens’ demands.
Disenchanted with the working of democracy and feeling
betrayed by a supposedly unresponsive political class, vot-
ers of populist parties are, thus, pushed away from main-
stream parties. This disenchantment and resulting anti-elite
sentiment can be considered equivalent to the absence of
external efficacy which is defined as the “belief that the
authorities or regime is responsive to influence attempts”
(Balch, 1974: 24) by the people.
Previous empirical research provides mixed results with
regard to the importance of these push factors when
explaining public support for populist parties. Most large-
N studies identify hostile attitudes toward the elite as one of
the core elements explaining support for populist parties
(Spierings and Zaslove, 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van
Kessel, 2018). Negative evaluations of politicians and
democratic institutions are found to be particularly reliable
indicators that distinguish populist voters from those of
mainstream parties (Schumacher and Rooduijn, 2013).
These push factors accordingly help to explain why people
support populist parties—be they “left or right wing”
(Hooghe et al., 2011; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015). As
a consequence, “populism is hardly ever considered to be a
positive voting choice” (Hooghe and Oser, 2015: 27) in
recent research.
These studies, however, do not answer the question
whether populist parties across Europe indeed benefit from
such push factors to the same extent. A recent study by
Rooduijn (2018) casts doubts on this idea. In his compar-
ison of populist voters in 15 Western European democra-
cies, he shows that low trust in democratic institutions and
feelings of lacking political responsiveness do not matter
for all populist parties equally and concludes that populist
voters have less in common than theoretical expectations
on populist parties suggest. Populist voters are thus not
united by the same intensity of critical stances toward the
political elite, but the significance of push factors varies
across countries and parties. In the following, we set out to
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explain this variation and argue that this fluctuating impact
resides in the degree of establishment of populist parties.
Populist party support and the impact
of external efficacy
Populist parties are not mere flash phenomena that auto-
matically disappear once confronted with the working of
democratic politics. A considerable number of these parties
managed to establish a lasting presence in national parlia-
ments and even to participate in national governments as
coalition partners or by lending support to minority gov-
ernments. Their ongoing establishment casts doubts on the
idea that populist parties can present themselves as pure
outsiders of the political system. Once they enter parlia-
ments and governments, they cannot avoid becoming part
of the daily business of legislative bargaining and delibera-
tion. As a consequence, more established populist parties
will be under pressure to soften their anti-elite appeals. In
line with those authors who underline the chameleonic
nature of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013;
Taggart, 2000), we argue that populist parties strategically
change the character and intensity of their anti-elite appeals
throughout different stages of their life cycle. Correspond-
ingly, the extent to which voting for populists is based on
anti-elite sentiment will vary with their degree of establish-
ment. In the following paragraphs, we discuss how estab-
lishment could affect the relationship between external
efficacy and populist party support by considering three
factors: presence in national parliaments, party size, and
government participation.
Populist parties often initially present themselves as
challengers to the political establishment and promote an
image that distinguishes them from their competitors.
Based on this outsider status and declared opposition to
(all) other parties, they capitalize on anti-party sentiment
and attract voters who feel alienated from the political
establishment. Especially younger populist parties have
been said to challenge the rules of the democratic
game by rigorously promoting antiestablishment messages
as those constitute promising vote-seeking strategies
(Akkerman, 2016). These kinds of strategies will dominate
parties’ rhetoric throughout the early stages of their devel-
opment because they must communicate a clear identity
that attracts a stable constituency in the mid-run. However,
populists do not only offer anti-elite rhetoric but also a clear
policy program that they promote during election cam-
paigns. Populist parties are thus not only vote seekers but
also aspire to gain policy influence and enter office (Akker-
man et al., 2016). Office-seeking goals will come to the
fore once populist parties manage to secure a permanent
support base among voters (Abedi and Lundberg, 2009).
This rebalancing of party goals requires populist parties to
accommodate potential coalition partners in order to max-
imize their office-seeking opportunities. Hence, populist
parties need to signal to potential coalition partners that
they will be reliable actors vis-a`-vis other non-populist
parties. Moderating their anti-elite appeals and respecting
the rules of the parliamentary game are crucial signals
pointing to their openness for negotiations and compro-
mises in office (Rooduijn et al., 2014).
In this regard, maintaining a harsh antiestablishment
profile turned out to be increasingly difficult for populist
parties with longer parliamentary representation. Promi-
nent examples are rhetorical reorientations as in the case
of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO¨) at the end of the
1990s (Heinisch, 2003), the Dutch Socialist Party in
2005 (van Kessel, 2015a) or the split of the Danish
People’s Party from the Progress Party in 1995 (Jupska˚s,
2015) which—after a period of continuous presence in
the national parliament—began to moderate their anti-
elite appeals with the aim of participating in future
governments. Populist parties thus changed their anties-
tablishment behavior significantly by toning down their
rhetoric and increasingly cooperating with other parties
in parliament (Akkerman, 2016).
Relationships with coalition partners that have been
developed prior to government participation must be culti-
vated when populist parties enter a ruling coalition. They
need to maintain agreements with their coalition partners in
order to guarantee the government’s stability. This might
be especially relevant for populist parties as these are often
accused of being uncapable and unable to deliver once
confronted with government responsibility (Heinisch,
2003; Kitschelt, 2007) with the consequence that failure
in government might result in damaging their image as
credible agents of policy change. Policy implementation
and the fulfillment of election pledges thus increase in
importance for their survival (Akkerman and de Lange,
2012: 578). In this regard, populist parties have frequently
been found to have modified their anti-elite discourse by
shifting from a general antiestablishment appeal to rhetori-
cally targeting specific actors of the political elite or only
single mainstream parties that do not represent potential
coalition partners (Akkerman and de Lange, 2012; Mudde,
2013).1 All in all, softening their anti-elite messages will be
more pronounced for populist parties that are part of
national governments either as formal coalition partners
or by lending support to minority governments than for
those in opposition.
The pattern of interaction between governing populist
and mainstream parties changes if the former manage to
win elections and gain full control over the government. In
this case, their status as pariah comes to an end and sustain-
ing an anti-elitist profile that targets established parties
becomes an impractical electoral strategy. This tendency
has been most present in the case of the “paternalist
populism” (Enyedi, 2016) put forward by Fidesz after win-
ning the Hungarian parliamentary elections in 2010. Viktor
Orba´n characterized this electoral victory as a “revolution”
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signaling a dissolution of the much-hated political elite
formerly ruling the country (Batory, 2016: 289). Enyedi
(2015: 244) finds that “many of the populist elements of
the party ideology were phased out” in the aftermath of
Fidesz’ electoral victory. Although elite-criticism did not
disappear from the discourses of ruling populist parties
(such as in Greece under Syriza, in Hungary under Fidesz,
and in Poland under the Law and Justice party (PiS)), it no
longer targeted the national parliament and its representa-
tives. Instead, populists continued to attack the EU, the
United States, foreign capitalists, “opulent millionaires,”
the media, or national democratic institutions limiting the
power of the now-ruling parties (see, e.g. Aslanidis and
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016; Batory, 2016).
We thus assume that populists’ anti-elite rhetoric
changes in accordance with different degrees of establish-
ment of these parties. This argument is also supported by
research on negative campaigning, that is, talking about
opponents’ “programs, accomplishments, qualifications,
associates, and so on—with the focus [...] on the defects
of these attributes” (Lau and Pomper, 2002: 48). With neg-
ative campaigning, parties thus try to discourage voters of
their competitors. In this regard, studies showed that the
relevance of negative campaigning varied with party char-
acteristics. Especially opposition parties, parties that lose in
the polls, parties with less coalition potential and those with
less government experience are more likely to “go
negative.” Conversely, negative campaigning is unusual
for parties with governmental experience, with electoral
fortune, and a positive coalition outlook, that is, established
parties (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2010; Walter et al., 2014).
Populist parties in particular seem to tend to engage in
negative campaigning (Nai, 2018), although to a lesser
degree when they see potential for future cooperation with
certain mainstream parties or when they are in power (van
Kessel and Castelein, 2016).
Based on these considerations, we consider the degree of
party establishment to be a result of the interplay of three
related factors: party age, the size of a party and govern-
ment participation. Taken in isolation, none of these party
characteristics is sufficient for viewing parties as an estab-
lished actor. For instance, the Sweden Democrats, founded
in 1988, never managed to gain more than 3% of the
national vote in a national election until 2006. It is thus
unlikely that this party was an established actor in this
period. Accordingly, we would not expect a change in the
impact of external efficacy as a determinant of its electoral
support. It was only after 2006 that their electoral support
increased steadily and the party became a more established
actor. Other examples of nonestablished populist parties
are those that managed to gain only short-term electoral
victories. For instance, the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF)
won 17% of the national vote share in their first national
election in 2002 and immediately entered a coalition gov-
ernment together with Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)
and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy
(VVD). Although LPF gained considerable electoral sup-
port, it was hardly a fully established actor in 2002. Con-
sequently, we, again, do not expect fundamental shifts in
the preferences of their voters on external efficacy. In con-
trast to this, the Polish PiS already gained 10% of the
national vote in its first election in 2001 and managed to
increase its vote share continually until the most recent
election in 2015. In 2005, the party entered a coalition
government and in 2015, PiS gained an absolute majority
in the Polish Sejm. Given the overall age of the Polish party
system, it can also be considered one of the older Polish
parties. Based on these three factors (party age, party size,
and government participation), PiS indeed constitutes a
highly established actor in the political arena of Poland.
In this case, we expect that lacking feelings of external
efficacy have been of decreasing importance over time for
citizens’ vote decisions. All in all, it is the combination of
these three factors that determines the overall degree of
establishment of a party.
To sum up, we argue that with increasing establish-
ment—understood in terms of long-lasting and electorally
successful parliamentary presence and government
participation—populist parties cannot maintain a strict
antiestablishment discourse. They become—at least to
some extent—part of the establishment they criticized. As
a consequence, they change both their communication
styles and their programs (Rooduijn et al., 2014). We thus
assume that the motives for supporting populist parties will
also differ for more and less established parties. Conse-
quently, we hypothesize that push factors, that is, anti-
elite sentiment, represented by a lack of external efficacy,
play less important a role in the vote function of more
established populist parties.
Methodology
We make use of a two-step strategy to analyze whether the
impact of the aforementioned push factors on populist party
support is conditioned by populist parties’ degree of estab-
lishment (Achen, 2005; Lewis and Linzer, 2005): First,
individual-level models are estimated separately for each
European populist party using ordinary least squares
regressions (step one). The dependent variable of these
individual-level models is the propensity to vote (PTV) for
the party. The primary advantage of using PTVs instead of
vote choice is that the latter might be contaminated in a
European election study by second-order electoral behavior
(Giebler and Wagner, 2015). Mobilization is lower in
second-order elections leaving us with fewer cases to ana-
lyze (especially for the smaller populist parties). In addi-
tion, voters might have second-order motives for voting for
a populist party, which could result in biased estimates for
our independent variables. Therefore, we use generalized
party utilities represented by voting propensities.
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In the second step, the resulting beta coefficients of
external efficacy for all parties are pooled and used as the
dependent variable of a linear regression. We include two
contextual control variables in this second step: a dummy
variable of Eastern versus Western Europe to capture struc-
tural differences between older and newer democracies,
and a second dummy indicating whether there is another
populist party in a given party system.
The main advantage of such a two-step design is the
simplicity of the analysis compared to a one-step mixed
model. As our independent variables explain the variance
of the importance of external efficacy on voting propensity,
we would have to model multiplicative interaction terms
between efficacy and the contextual variables. Furthermore,
if the ratio of context-level units divided by lower-level units
(individuals) is very small, as in our case, two-step strategies
are as efficient as one-step multilevel models (Achen, 2005;
Jusko and Shively, 2005). The two-step design also allows to
model party support for left- and right-wing populist parties
more appropriately in accordance with their host ideology in
the first-step regressions. For left-wing populists, we use
socioeconomic issues of redistribution and taxation as the
relevant issue positions; for right-wing populist parties, we
control for sociocultural issue stances on immigration and
same-sex marriage.
The hypothesis advanced in the preceding section is
tested using a combined data set of the voter survey for the
2014 elections to the European Parliament (Schmitt et al.,
2015) and the database “Elections, Parties, Governments”
(WZB, 2017). The latter provides data on 70 countries in
the world, including all European member states. Data on
government participation and election results are taken
from this database. The cross-sectional postelection survey
covers political attitudes and political behavior as well as a
number of sociodemographic parameters for about 1100
respondents per EU country. This allows comparative
examination of support for populist parties across a broad
country sample using a uniform measurement tool. Since
the data set comprises several country samples, the data are
prestructured at this level, bringing a risk of idiosyncratic
error correlations (Beck and Katz, 1995). We tackle this
problem by calculating cluster-corrected standard errors for
the countries in the second-step regression.2
We identify populist parties based on the classification
proposed by van Kessel (2015b), who systematized popu-
list parties through secondary analysis and expert inter-
views. Parties are accordingly defined as populist if they
paint a picture of a fundamentally upright and homoge-
neous “people” whose sovereignty is curbed by the rule
of the elites. Populist parties stylize themselves as the con-
trary of the political establishment, whom they accuse of
acting against the interests of the people (van Kessel,
2015b: 33). We distinguish between left- and right-wing
populist parties in terms of their connections with one of
the two core or “host” ideologies. Countries in which
neither a relevant left-wing populist party nor a right-
wing party of the same ilk was standing for election were
excluded from the sample.3
The study covers 23 European countries (14 from West-
ern Europe and 9 from Eastern Europe) in which we iden-
tified 36 populist parties. The vast majority of populist
parties in Europe were on the right wing (26) in 2014; in
12 countries, this was the only variety present, whereas in 7
countries, right-wing populists competed with left-wing
populist parties. In Ireland (Sinn Fe´in) and Spain (Pode-
mos), we could only distinguish left-wing populists.
First-step variables
In the preceding section, we identified the main variable
explaining support for populist parties as disaffection
with political actors and institutions.4 We measure these
attitudinal patterns of party supporters based on external
efficacy. By external efficacy, we mean the individually
perceived responsiveness of the political system, which
we measure in terms of voters’ evaluations whether the
parliament takes the cares and concerns of citizens
seriously.5
The first control variable is internal efficacy, that is, the
self-assessment regarding whether politics and the work
of the government appear to be too complicated for the
respondent. Second, we include the subjective assessment
of the economic situation in the respondent’s country. The
answers are included in the analysis on a three-point scale
from “much better” to “no change” to “much worse”;
respondents were asked for both retrospective and pro-
spective assessment. For the attitudes of respondents
toward the EU, we use two items. The first is the evalua-
tion of the EU membership of a country in general, which
was measured on a three-point scale from “good” to
“neutral” to “bad.” Second, we use respondent attitudes
toward the desirability of EU influence on national bud-
gets. This influence was evaluated on a scale running from
0 “The EU should have more influence on the economic
and budgetary policy of EU member states” to 10 “[Coun-
try of the respondent] should retain full control over its
economic and budgetary policy.”
Attitudinal variables on issue positions measure the
extent to which support for a populist party was due to
substantive motives. The weight of specific issues for
attracting support for a populist party depends on the con-
comitant core ideology. For left-wing populists, such issues
are greater redistribution and higher taxes. Right-wing
populists, by contrast, mobilize along cultural cleavages,
so that we use the respondents’ positions toward a more
restrictive immigration policy and rejection of same-sex
marriage. Issue attitudes are measured on an 11-point scale
between the poles of absolute agreement and absolute
rejection on a specific issue. Lastly, the analysis includes
sociodemographic control variables, namely, age, gender,
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education (age of highest educational qualification on a
four-point scale), and employment status (unemployed vs.
gainfully employed at the time of the survey).
Second-step variables
Our explanatory moderator variable on the party level rep-
resents the degree to which a party is established in the
party system. Here, establishment is a latent construct rep-
resenting the opposite of a young and new, rather small
opposition party—an image often (implicitly) applied to
populist challengers. We expect this factor to be a compo-
sition of party age, party size, and government participa-
tion. If a party is older, larger, and part of a coalition or
even single-party government, it can no longer be seen as
an anti-system outsider but has more or less become an
established player within the system. As explicated above,
none of the three components seems sufficient to change a
populist party into an established part of a given party
system. Consequently, we understand establishment as
consisting of all three components, albeit to varying
degrees. Using principal component analysis, we retrieved
a factor from the three manifest variables (relevant) party
age, party size, and government participation. Relevant
party age is measured as the years since the party first
gained more than 5% of the national vote. Due to the
skewed distribution—few parties have existed for a longer
time span, most of the populist parties are rather young—
and because of the marginal utility of the, say, 20th year of
existence, we use the logarithm of this variable. Party size
is measured as the vote share at the last national election.
Government participation is a dummy variable indicating
whether a populist party was either officially part of a
government or a government supporter up to 2014. The
resulting component with an eigenvalue of about 1.6
explains more than 55% of the variance.6
The distribution of the resulting index is presented in
Figure 1. The values for establishment range from 2
(Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja)
to close to 3 (the Hungarian Fidesz).
The following multivariate models of the second-step
regression control for two variables that might be confoun-
ders for the relationship under investigation. First, it might
be that external efficacy unfolds a different effect in East-
ern and Western European countries. Studies suggest that
lacking feelings of external efficacy are especially wide-
spread in the party systems of the young democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe. As a consequence, this factor
might be of less relevance for explaining populist party
support. For that reason, we include a dummy variable
indicating East and Central European countries. Second,
the importance of lacking feelings of external efficacy is
possibly influenced by the number of populist parties in a
party system. If more than one populist challenger is suc-
cessful, disenchantment with the political elite is likely to
be less decisive when determining the support for one
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Figure 1. Distribution: establishment of populist parties in 2014.
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specific populist party. Again, we include a dummy vari-
able to control for this possibility.
Results
As a first step, we estimated separate OLS regressions for
the 36 populist parties. The dependent variable PTV was
regressed on external efficacy controlling for internal effi-
cacy, attitudes on European integration, the evaluation of
the economy, attitudes on taxation and redistribution (only
for left-wing populist parties) or immigration and same-sex
marriage (only for right-wing populist parties), as well as
sociodemographic controls. The results for the 36 regres-
sion analyses can be found in the Tables A.4 and A.5 in the
Online Appendix.
Figure 2 summarizes the effects of lacking external effi-
cacy on the PTV for a populist party for each country
included in the analysis. In line with the findings of Roo-
duijn (2018) and our theoretical expectations, the estimates
do not only vary regarding their statistical significance but
also with regard to their direction. Six of the eight parties
benefiting from lacking feelings of political responsiveness
(i.e. with significant positive effects presented in Figure 2)
had never been part of their respective national govern-
ments until 2014. We further find numerous recently estab-
lished parties, such as the Spanish Podemos or the German
AfD, in this group. Parties held out of government by a
cordon sanitaire (the Belgian Vlaams Belang or the
French Front National) also benefit the most from anties-
tablishment attitudes. At the same time, two cases run
counter to our expectations. The Dutch PVV and the Dan-
ish DF have supported minority governments in the past
and had been able to gain seats for at least three election
cycles. Although these two parties were in government
until 2014, they might have been successful in presenting
themselves as political outsiders even while they joined or
supported national governments. In this case, they would
thus be examples of the “one foot in and one foot out of
government” strategy (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005:
953).
On the other hand, lacking external efficacy shows a
significantly negative effect in nine cases. Strikingly, the
effect of feelings of external efficacy is strongest for the
two populist parties in single-party majority governments
(Fidesz and Smer). The remaining parties—except for the
Croatian Labourists–Labour Party—have all been part of a
government since their foundation and thus correspond to
the idea of a more established party. All in all, this visual
inspection lends support to our hypothesis that voting for
populist parties is less driven by feelings of political disen-
chantment the more established these parties are.
Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between our
two variables of interest along with a linear trend and 95%
confidence intervals. The plot lends preliminary support
for our central hypothesis. The size of the coefficient of
lacking external efficacy is lower the more established a
populist party is. As already indicated in Figure 2, Slova-
kia and Hungary have the most negative effect for lacking
external efficacy. Given the limited number of observa-
tions in our study, it is possible that regression results are
influenced by these particular cases. The following anal-
yses will not only investigate the effects of the full model
including all populist parties, but we will also focus on the
question whether outlying cases drive the regression
results of our main model.
We systematically analyze how the effects of external
efficacy are influenced by the degree of establishment of
the respective populist party by running the second-step
regression. Hence, we regress the coefficient of external
efficacy that has been derived from the country specific
regressions on our establishment measure while controlling
for the number of populist parties and Eastern European
countries. Table 1 shows the corresponding results. The
results in the first column are based on the entire country
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Figure 2. Coefficient of external efficacy on the propensity to
vote for a populist party per country with 95% confidence bands.
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selection without dropping any outlying cases. Consider-
ing, first, the adjusted R2 (more than 50%), this model
explains large proportions of the variance presented in
Figure 2. In line with our central hypothesis, the coefficient
of populist party establishment is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level, indicating that with a one-unit
increase in our measure of establishment, the effect of
external efficacy decreases by 0.17 points.
The corresponding marginal effects plot (Figure 4, left
panel) illustrates that the effect of lacking external efficacy
on populist party support is only positive and significant for
parties that are not established. Figure 4 furthermore sug-
gests that the effect of lacking external efficacy becomes
negative and significant for highly established populist par-
ties. Populist parties with a long-standing presence in the
national parliament and those in office benefit from posi-
tive feelings toward political responsiveness. Moreover, the
dummy for Eastern European countries in table 1 equally
shows a negative effect indicating that the impact of lack-
ing external efficacy is lower in East European than in West
European countries. This result is corresponding with
observations pointing to the different character of anti-
elite sentiment in these countries. Due to the lacking insti-
tutionalization of East European party systems, external
efficacy is likely to play a more prominent role in these
countries in general and is, thus, of less importance for
explaining vote choice for specific parties (see, e.g.
Kriesi, 2014). Lastly, the effect of additional populist
parties within a party system also indicates a negative
effect. This is in line with the expectation that the
presence of multiple populist parties decreases the over-
all relevance of push factors as determinants of support
for one specific populist party.
As mentioned above, given the limited number of obser-
vations in the second step of our analysis, we must be
careful with drawing conclusions. Outlying cases could
drive the identified effect of populist party establishment
on the impact of lacking external efficacy. For that reason,
we use Cook’s distance criterion to identify potentially
influential cases, that is, populist parties with large resi-
duals or high leverage that could distort the results of our
analysis. Based on this, four cases (GERB, UKIP, Fidesz,
and Smer) were identified and excluded from the analysis.
Importantly, this also includes the two cases that we have—
by visual inspection of Figure 3—identified as potential
drivers of our statistical effects. Model 2 in Table 1 lists
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Figure 3. Bivariate relationship of establishment and first-step coefficients of lacking external efficacy. Note: Linear fit with 95%
confidence bands.
Table 1. Second-step model.
DV: No external efficacy (effect size)
1 2
Main model W/o outliers
Establishment .173** (.065) .116** (.050)
Eastern Europe .328** (.128) .305** (.123)
Multiple Populist Parties .303** (.121) .308** (.128)
Constant .275*** (.084) .321*** (.066)
Observations 36 32
Adjusted R2 .521 .466
Note: Country clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.
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the outcomes for this model. While the effect size of our
independent variable of interest decreases, the size of the
standard error is also reduced by approximately one-fourth.
The results confirm the main finding of the first model. At
the same time, the effects of the further two covariates
remain statistically significant and point in the expected
directions. We thus conclude that the identified effect of
populist party establishment is not dependent on influential
cases. Moreover, the corresponding marginal effects plot
(Figure 4, right panel) equally confirms the results of the
main model. However, in contrast to the first model, the
marginal effect of lacking external efficacy no longer turns
statistically significant for highly established parties. This
suggests that especially populist parties that are in single-
party majority governments benefit from increasing levels
of external efficacy.
Robustness
We tested for the robustness of our results by applying
alternative specifications of our party establishment indi-
cator (table 2). In model 1, an alternative measure of popu-
list party establishment was used that does not take populist
party support of minority governments into account.
Furthermore, we excluded party age (model 2), party size
(model 3), and government participation (model 4) when
calculating the establishment score. None of these four
alternative operationalizations of our main explanatory
variable of step 2 changes the significance or substance
of our results.
In the second set of robustness checks, we included
further potentially relevant control variables. Model 5 con-
trols for the possibility that either left-wing or right-wing
populist parties could be primarily driven by lacking exter-
nal efficacy. This is not the case—the coefficient is not
statistically significant. Again, size and significance of
populist party establishment remain stable in this specifica-
tion. Moreover, a change in the nature of established popu-
list parties has to be distinguished from a mere moderation
effect concerning their policy stances. Whereas decreasing
importance of anti-elite criticism and a decrease in radic-
alism might empirically go hand in hand, they are concep-
tually different phenomena. When a populist party
becomes an established player in a given party system,
push factors should lose their relevance. However, this is
not necessarily linked to the radicalism of a party—new
parties can be moderate, and established parties can
become more radical. Hence, we expect the effect of popu-
list party establishment on the importance of external effi-
cacy to be unrelated to the moderation or de-radicalization
of the respective party. We controlled for the degree of
radicalism by considering the position of each populist
party on a general left-right scale provided by the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015). In order to
account for country-specific characteristics, we constructed
radicalism as the difference between the populist parties’
scores and the mean position of the overall party system
weighted by the vote shares of each party. Controlling for
radicalism does not substantially change any results (model
6).7 Therefore, we are confident that a potential de-
Main model W/o outliers
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 −2 −1 0 1 2
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
Establishment
M
ar
gi
na
l E
ff
ec
t o
f 
N
o 
E
xt
er
na
l E
ff
ic
ac
y
Figure 4. Marginal effects of establishment on external efficacy. Note: Marginal effects with 90% confidence bands.
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radicalization of the parties does not drive the effects found
in the main model.
In addition, electoral research has shown that long-
standing partisanship is one of the most relevant factors
explaining party choice. This sociopsychological bond
might be a dividing characteristic for supporters of more
and less established parties. We controlled for party iden-
tification in the first step of the analysis to make sure that
the effects of external efficacy were not merely due to
differences in party identification. Model 7 indicates that
if we include party identification in the first-step regres-
sions, the effect size of establishment on external efficacy
decreases slightly. The same holds for the level of signifi-
cance although the effect remains significant at the 10%
level. In the last of the robustness checks, we calculated the
mean score of respondents’ trust in the national parliament
and parliament’s perceived responsiveness and introduced
this alternative measure of external efficacy in the first-step
regression models. Again, the results at the second step
remain substantively similar to the main model. Based on
these results, we are confident to conclude that the identi-
fied impact of our establishment measure is neither caused
by influential cases nor due to model specification. More-
over, the effect remains stable when controlling for the
ideology or radicalism of populist parties, which reduces
the risk of spurious correlation.
Lastly, we reestimated the main model using a classical
multilevel model including cross-level interactions
between external efficacy and establishment, Eastern Eur-
ope, and the number of populist parties in a given party
system. We also inspected a multilevel logistic regression
model where we replaced the dependent variable with the
respondents’ vote intention in the next national election.
Again, the establishment measure affects the impact of
lacking external efficacy negatively and is only positive
and significant for less established parties.8
Conclusion
Recent literature has investigated the support bases of
populist parties from the right and the left end of the Eur-
opean party spectrum (Rooduijn, 2018; Spierings and
Zaslove, 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018).
While these studies have contributed to the pressing ques-
tion as to what unites voters of populist parties, they also
pointed to certain research gaps. In contrast to previous
expectations, which assumed political discontent to be a
primary determinant of populist vote choice, they draw a
more differentiated picture. As illustrated most clearly by
Rooduijn (2018), common indicators of political disen-
chantment (such as lacking trust in parliaments and politi-
cians) do not matter for all populist parties to the same
extent. This article set out to explain the varying impact
of these indicators.T
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In a first step, we explored the effect of lacking external
efficacy on populist party support on a broad empirical basis.
This is—to the best of our knowledge—the first study sys-
tematically exploring the impact of political disaffection on
populist vote choice that goes beyond the universe of West
European party systems. Considering also the “very different
world of Central and Eastern European politics” (Kriesi,
2014: 373), our study confirmed the finding mentioned ear-
lier: Lacking external efficacy plays to the advantage of
some populist parties, but not of others. In some cases, even
the opposite is true: Feelings of political responsiveness
contribute to the success of these parties. In a second step,
based on voter data on 36 populist parties in 23 EU coun-
tries, we have shown that support for populist parties is less
driven by lacking external efficacy the more established the
parties are in their respective party systems. In other words,
while recently founded, smaller parties without government
experience indeed benefit from anti-elite sentiment, this rela-
tionship does not hold for established populist parties. Our
results prove to be robust even if alternative ways are used to
operationalize the establishment measure.
Two normative interpretations of our results are possi-
ble. On the one hand, an optimistic reading of the findings
would suggest that populist parties, when becoming estab-
lished parts of the respective party system, lose their
populist appeal to some extent. This would imply a reduc-
tion of populism and a “normalization” of their electoral
support. A pessimistic reading, on the other hand, might
point to democratically less positive shifts. Established
populist parties might simply switch from blaming
national institutions and actors to targeting, for example,
supranational institutions like the EU. Recent develop-
ments in Poland and Hungary seem to speak in favor of
this latter interpretation.
It is important to emphasize that our empirical analysis
does not test for the underlying causal mechanisms, that is,
the question which and how voters’ attitudes change with
regard to the support of populist parties. On the one hand,
the decreasing effect of lacking external efficacy might be
due to attitude changes among the core constituencies of
populist parties. In this case, supporters would perceive
populist parties as less different from established parties
in terms of their outsider status and change their opinion
regarding the working of democratic politics in their coun-
try. On the other hand, the observed relationship might be
the result of a compositional effect. In this case, more
established populist parties might increasingly attract sup-
porters that are more concerned about populists’ concrete
policy positions at the expense of anti-elite sentiment.
Investigating this relationship would necessitate panel data
in order to observe and explain changing party preferences
of individual voters. While such an approach lies beyond
the scope of this article, it is a promising endeavor for
future research. Lastly, the electoral consequences of
increasing establishment and the demonstrated shifts in
voters’ motives to support populist parties so far remain
unexplored. Previous research has started to underline that
increasing establishment and continued electoral success
might cause populist parties to strengthen their organiza-
tional structure and enhance their agency credibility, which
helps them with mass mobilization (Heinisch and Mazzo-
leni, 2016). Future research will have to focus on these
supply-side factors in order to explain the determinants of
populist parties’ electoral survival.
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Notes
1. In this context, Albertazzi and McDonnell (2005: 953) find
that populist parties are most successful when they maintain
a “one foot in and one foot out of government” strategy, allow-
ing them to keep up their claim of being distinct from their
established coalition partners and, at the same time, to imple-
ment concrete policy goals. Consequently, in these cases, the
significance of anti-elite sentiment is further reduced as an
explanatory factor of populist party support.
2. Alternative specifications of the standard errors do not affect
our empirical results in a substantial way. Please see Table A.2
in Online Appendix.
3. Table A.1 in the Online Appendix lists all populist parties.
4. See the Online Appendix for a detailed discussion of the con-
trol variables that have been included in the first-step
regression.
5. The wording of the external efficacy question was “The
(NATIONALITY PARLIAMENT) takes the concerns of
(NATIONALITY) citizens into consideration.” Respondents
could indicate their opinion on this statement on a four-point
scale ranging from “total agreement” to “total disagreement.”
The question thus refers to the belief that institutions and pol-
iticians are unresponsive to citizens’ demand. Consequently, we
focus on the “no care” dimension of external efficacy and do not
include the “no say” dimension (Converse, 1972). This is due to
two reasons. First, we employ this “no care” item because it
reflects the populist message that established political actors and
institutions would ignore the demands of ordinary citizens.
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Second, most comparative survey studies (e.g. the European
Election Studies or the European Voter Projects) do not include
questions on the “no say” dimension of external efficacy. How-
ever, Balch (1974) indicated that “no say” and “no care” corre-
late highly with political trust. We test the robustness of our
results by using a combined measure of “no care” and political
trust as the independent variable (model 8 in table 2).
6. The correlation with the three constitutive variables party size,
party age, and government participation is 0.53, 0.51, and 0.67,
respectively.
7. We lose one case in this regression as the Chapel Hill Expert
Survey does not include information on the Greater Romania
Party.
8. See Table A.3 and Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix for the
corresponding regression tables and marginal effects plots.
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